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ABSTRACT: US security force assistance missions to Arab
partner states have had limited success, due in part to a tendency
to impose American doctrine, which embodies American cultural
values and norms, on Arab armed forces. Accordingly, US security
force assistance missions should train Arab partners to fight
in a manner better suited to their own cultural preferences and
operational requirements.

T

he United States must develop a radically different method of
training partner Arab militaries to help them better meet future
counterterrorism, unconventional, and conventional warfare
challenges.1 Doing so will require the US military to approach the task in
a very different way than it has in the past, devoting the same creativity,
willingness to experiment, sustained focus, and seriousness of purpose
to the security force assistance (SFA) mission, that it has to building up
its own combat capabilities.2 While the US military has applied cultural
knowledge to the mechanics and programmatic aspects of the SFA
relationship in Iraq and elsewhere, there is little evidence to suggest it has
done so systematically and consistently in its efforts to create effective
combat units or capable national security institutions.
Since World War II, the Middle East has been a major recipient
of American arms and military assistance. Today, nearly half of all US
arms exports go to the region, and US military personnel train or advise
more than a dozen Arab militaries.3 Yet despite this massive, sustained
effort, US SFA has not helped create competent Arab armed forces.
During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Egyptian, Saudi, and Kuwaiti
forces failed to acquit themselves well despite overwhelming coalition

1. The authors would like to thank Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, US Army retired;
Lieutenant General Sean B. MacFarland, US Army retired; Colonel David M. Witty, US Army retired;
and two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable insights and comments on an earlier draft of this
article.
2. James F. Jeffrey and Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Military Engagement in the Broader Middle East,
Policy Focus 143 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016), http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus143_JeffreyEisen-4.pdf;
and Eisenstadt, “‘Defeat Into Victory’: Arab Lessons for the Iraqi Security Forces,” Policy Watch 2373
(Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 17, 2015), https://www
.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeat-into-victory-arab-lessons-for-the-iraqi
-security-forces.
3. Susan B. Epstein and Liana W. Rosen, U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs:
Overview of Funding Trends, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R45091, February 1, 2018,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45091.pdf; and Clayton Thomas, Arms Sales in the Middle East:
Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy, CRS Report R44984, October 11, 2017, https://fas
.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf.
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superiority.4 In June 2014, several hundred fighters from the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) routed tens of thousands of Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) troops when they captured the city of Mosul.5 And since
2015, Saudi forces leading an Arab coalition in Yemen have struggled
against Houthi tribal fighters—although the small United Arab Emirates
(UAE) contingent did considerably better in advancing the Emirates’
diverse goals there.6
The US experience in Iraq and Syria since 2014 has yielded a
somewhat different picture, however. In both places, the US military
has made a virtue out of necessity. With successive administrations
unwilling to commit large US ground combat formations to accomplish
ongoing missions in the Middle East, US commanders have had to devise
a method of winning wars by, with, and through indigenous partners.7
These efforts have been much more successful than previous efforts
in the region in large part because American personnel have tailored
operations to partner capabilities—predominantly Kurdish forces in
Syria and largely Arab forces in Iraq—rather than insisting they fight
like the US military.
This welcome, relatively recent operational approach has not yet
been translated into formal doctrine nor has it spawned an extensive
lessons-learned literature. Previous SFA efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
produced findings on a range of issues including core challenges
of building tactically competent units and creating institutional
capacity as well as the mechanics of SFA and its bureaucratic and
programmatic aspects.8

4. Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2002), 425–46.
5. Yasir Abbas and Dan Trombly, “Inside the Collapse of the Iraqi Army’s 2nd Division,” War
on the Rocks, July 1, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/inside-the-collapse-of-the-iraqi
-armys-2nd-division/; and Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab
Military Effectiveness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 165–68.
6. Michael Knights, “Lessons from the UAE War in Yemen,” Lawfare (blog), August 18, 2019,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-uae-war-yemen; and Knights, “The U.A.E. Approach
to Counterinsurgency in Yemen,” War on the Rocks, May 23, 2016, https://warontherocks
.com/2016/05/the-u-a-e-approach-to-counterinsurgency-in-yemen/.
7. Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD),
January 2018); and Joseph L. Votel and Eero R. Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational
Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2nd Quarter 2018): 40–47, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint
-Force-Quarterly-89.aspx.
8. James Dubik, “Partner Capacity Building and U.S. Enabling Capabilities,” Army Magazine,
(Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, May 2012), https://www.ausa.org/sites
/default/FC_Dubik_0512_pdf; Owen West, “Why Obama’s Plan to Send Advisers to Iraq Will
Fail,” New York Times, June 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/why-obamas
-plan-to-send-advisers-to-iraq-will-fail.html; DoD Office of the Inspector General (DODIG),
Assessment of DoD/USCENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Iraqi Army
to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, IG Report DODIG-2015-177 (Washington, DC:
DODIG, September 30, 2015), https://media.defense.gov/2015/Sep/30/2001714172/-1/-1/1
/DODIG-2015-177.pdf; and DoDIG, Summary of Lessons Learned—DoD IG Assessment Oversight of
“Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip” Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Inspector
General Report DODIG-2015-093 (Washington, DC: DODIG, March 31, 2015), https://media
.defense.gov/2015/Mar/31/2001713483/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2015-093.pdf.
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These findings, however, devoted little attention to addressing
specific challenges of building capable combat formations and national
security institutions in the Middle Eastern cultural and political milieu.
With the exception of the effort to rebuild the ISF during the 2007–8
US surge in Iraq and again after the ISIS offensive in 2014, American
SFA activities throughout the region have generally suffered from this
gap between doctrine and reality. Of greatest importance, the United
States did not formulate new SFA practices nor a unique doctrine for
America’s Arab partners. To its credit, the Army did create Security
Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs).9 These SFABs are a good start, but
they are not capable of formulating a new combat doctrine and have a
limited capacity to devise new instructional methods more appropriate
to Arab partner militaries. Moreover, they are not designed to build the
necessary institutional capacity at the ministerial level to allow partner
militaries to stand on their own.10
The implicit subtext of much of the lessons-learned literature is,
for instance, that Iraqi soldiers need to become more like Americans
and the ISF needs to operate more like the US military (with a strong
noncommissioned officer [NCO] corps, for example), not that the United
States should tailor its approach to its partner’s cultural predilections
and operational requirements—though there are signs of progress.11
Unsurprisingly, efforts to train Arab militaries to fight like the US
military have generally not succeeded because they require the former to
operate in ways contrary to deeply rooted and culturally grounded habits
and norms.12 And while SFA efforts have been tailored to account for
the skill level and experience of partner militaries, US military personnel
are only just beginning to formulate, systematically, SFA doctrine for
Arab militaries that is culturally relevant, and they are doing so largely
on their own initiative, without formal guidance or a wider program
to learn and institutionalize such practices across American training
missions in the Arab world.

Arab Military Ineffectiveness

The sources of Arab military ineffectiveness run deep. They are
rooted in wider Arab society, and cultural tendencies which foster
patterns of behavior that have not meshed well with the demands of

9. Andrew Feikert, Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), In Focus 10675 (Washington,
DC: CRS, October 24, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10675.pdf.
10. James M. Dubik, “SFABs are Great, But They Can’t Build Nations,” Association
of the United States Army, June 18, 2018, https://www.ausa.org/articles/sfabs-are-great
-they-can%E2%80%99t-build-nations.
11. Ben Kesling and Matt Bradley, “Victory Marks Turnaround for Iraq Army,” Wall Street
Journal, December 29, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-security-forces-say-they-have
-liberated-ramadi-from-islamic-state-1451303441; and Karen DeYoung, “Victory in Ramadi May
Not Yet Be Proof of Strategy, but It Is a Milestone,” Washington Post, January 1, 2016, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/victory-in-ramadi-may-not-yet-not-be-proof-of
-strategy-but-it-is-a-milestone/2016/01/01/7915e874-aff5-11e5-9ab0-884d1cc4b33e_story.html.
12. Norvell B. DeAtkine, “Western Influence on Arab Militaries: Pounding Square Pegs into
Round Holes,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 17, no. 1 (Spring 2013); and Pollack, Armies
of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (New York: Oxford University Press,
2019).
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modern conventional warfare and counterinsurgency. One of the most
important of these societal problems is the zero-sum, winner-takes-all
politics of the Arab world.13 Too often Arab armies have played too big
a role in politics, and when they have not, Arab politicians have typically
played too big a role in military affairs. Indeed since World War II, Arab
states have often oscillated between military dictatorships and civilian
autocracies that fettered their armed forces to defend against military
coups—real or imagined.
This politicization has often hobbled war-making activity by
saddling Arab armed forces with incompetent but loyal senior leaders,
as well as command and control arrangements designed to coupproof the armed forces rather than enhance their effectiveness. These
measures can undermine the morale and cohesion of a military.14 This
zero-sum mindset is also reflected in the brute-force approach to
counterinsurgency employed by many Arab armies, which generally
entails crushing insurgents and repressing, driving out, or even
eliminating the supporting civilian populations.15
Underdevelopment in Arab economies has also played a role.
Industrialization came late to the Muslim Middle East and never reached
the extent it did in the West or in East Asia. Relatively few Arab personnel
had the kind of basic understanding of machinery necessary to enable
them to maintain properly or take full advantage of the capabilities of
equipment used to wage modern war. Repeatedly, Arab armies, navies,
and air forces could not employ weaponry to its full potential. Moreover,
only a fraction of their weapons systems were typically combat ready due
to inadequate maintenance.16
Ultimately, however, the greatest problems Arab armed forces
experienced during the modern era derived from the dominant Arab
culture.17 This is not a value judgment, merely a description of the social
reality of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Behavioral
patterns emphasized by the dominant Arab culture, while functional
in other contexts, were not best suited for success on the modern
conventional battlefield. Arab culture tends to promote a deference to
group norms and authority, an emphasis on rote learning and school
solutions rather than the development of critical reasoning skills,
and a preoccupation with saving face, resulting in the suppression of
unpalatable facts. These patterns of behavior produced conventional
Arab armies that often failed at maneuver warfare because tactical
leaders were inflexible; did not show initiative or innovation; and tended
to obfuscate, dissemble, or lie.

13. Florence Gaub, “Why Arab States are Bad at Counterinsurgency,” Lawfare (blog), June 21,
2015, https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-arab-states-are-bad-counterinsurgency.
14. Pollack, Armies of Sand, 107–232; and James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing: Its Practice and
Consequences in the Middle East,” International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 131–65.
15. Gaub, “Bad at Counterinsurgency.”
16. Pollack, Armies of Sand, 233–342.
17. Pollack, Armies of Sand, 343–509.
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Thus Arab militaries have been consistently crippled by passive and
unimaginative tactical leadership, an inability to conduct combined arms
operations, and badly distorted flows of information across their chains
of command, especially at tactical levels. Arab cultural preferences
have also hindered effective air operations, weapons handling, and
maintenance.18 This reality reflects the emphases of the dominant
culture—an impact economists and social scientists have recognized
as having hindered political and industrial development and economic
productivity during the modern era as well.19

Training Assistance to the Arab World

Militaries reflect the societies they come from. Methods the US
military devises to fight wars and train young Americans to do so do
not necessarily fit the young people who compose the armed forces of
very different societies. Given differences between Arab and American
society, it is unsurprising the gulf between how Americans think things
should be done and how Arabs think things should be done is wide. It is
worth noting that in their efforts to train Arab militaries, the Russians
have fared little better for precisely the same reasons.20
Thus if the United States is going to help build better Arab militaries,
it must account for the impact of culture and other aspects of Arab society
and adjust accordingly. At least in the short term it should generally
eschew efforts to remake partner Arab militaries in its own image—
creating forces which can implement mission-type orders, staffed by
officers and NCOs capable of operating with little or no guidance, and
improvising as needed in response to battlefield developments. Rather,
it should train them to fight in a manner better suited to their cultural
preferences and operational requirements.21
The United States will need to experiment with new approaches to
SFA, be willing to make mistakes, and recognize the road to success
may be as long and as difficult as the effort to rebuild and remake the
US Army between its defeat in Vietnam and its victory in the Persian

18. Pollack, Armies of Sand, 369–405, 439–51.
19. Gary S. Gregg, The Middle East: A Cultural Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), 341–56; Pollack, Armies of Sand, 406–14; and United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) reports including Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS), UNDP, Arab Human Development
Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society (New York: RBAS, UNDP, 2003); and RBAS, UNDP, Arab
Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New York: RBAS, UNDP, 2005).
20. Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The
Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries,” Middle East Journal 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001):
549–78.
21. Eisenstadt, “‘Defeat Into Victory.’”
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Gulf War.22 And to some extent these efforts will be conducted under
fire, while partner and Allied militaries are dealing with domestic and
external threats. In order to create more effective fighting organizations,
the United States would benefit by studying successful Arab efforts to
rebuild their militaries after defeat and learn from these examples.23
Such efforts, described below, can point the way toward more effective
US approaches to SFA in the Arab world.

Building Elite Formations

Arab armed forces have often dealt with challenges posed by military
ineffectiveness by creating small, specially trained, elite units. These
may be ad hoc, task-organized units consisting of proven performers or
standing elite formations trained to a higher standard than the rest of
the military with preferential access to the newest equipment.
The more a military can select those with the right skills and abilities
from the wider force and concentrate them in elite formations, the more
capable those formations are likely to be, due to the synergies created by
having so many highly capable personnel working together. Moreover,
creating smaller units increases the likelihood they can be filled with
personnel with the right skills. The opposite is also true: it is harder to
fill larger units with personnel with the appropriate (but, in the Arab
militaries, culturally rare) skills needed for success on the modern
conventional battlefield. The example of elite forces may also inspire
conventional personnel and units to raise their standards and improve
their performance.
Small can be beautiful when building greater military effectiveness
through elite Arab formations for another reason: it can facilitate a
chain of command populated with officers with the right skill sets. A
competent battalion commander can be stymied and frustrated if he
has to report to an incompetent brigade commander or if his company
commanders lack his skills and understanding. Going small maximizes
the number of officers with the right skills throughout a command
structure, ensuring superior performance.
Not surprisingly, many of the more successful Arab elite formations
have been special forces-type units. Those who volunteer for such
units tend to be more highly motivated and, as is the case elsewhere,
many are cultural outliers—individuals with uncommon skills and/or a

22. “Rebuilding the Army: Vietnam to Desert Storm,” in American Military History: Volume
II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2008, ed. Richard W. Stewart (Washington, DC:
US Army Center of Military History, 2010), 373–411, https://history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2
/PDF/Chapter12.pdf; Suzanne C. Nielson, An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army’s Post-Vietnam
Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations, The Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 2010), https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/an
-army-transformed-the-u-s-armys-post-vietnam-recovery-and-the-dynamics-of-change-in-military
-organizations/; and Barry D. Watts, US Combat Training, Operational Art, and Strategic Competence:
Problems and Opportunities, Strategy for the Long Haul Series (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2008.08.21
-Combat-Training-Operational-Art-Strategic-Competence.pdf.
23. Eisenstadt, “‘Defeat Into Victory’”; and Pollack, Armies of Sand, 452–509.
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greater willingness to adopt novel practices. Because they are elite, these
units tend to have higher esprit de corps, morale, and unit cohesion
than conventional units. Moreover, their training frequently emphasizes
small-unit actions, independent operations, and improvised solutions to
unexpected problems.
Various Arab militaries have tried this approach with varying
degrees of success. The Syrians recognized after the Yom Kippur War
(1973) and their intervention in Lebanon (1976) that the special forces
regiments were their most capable units, and they transferred many of
the best soldiers and officers to these formations resulting in the latter’s
superior performance during the Lebanon War (1982).24 The Iraqis did
the same on a grander scale in expanding the Republican Guard after
1986. The Guard comprised a much higher percentage of Iraqi ground
force personnel than did Syrian commando units, and most Guard
formations did not receive special forces training. As a result, while
unquestionably more capable (and more dedicated) than the Iraqi regular
army, the Guard did not perform as well as Syria’s special forces.25
More recently, in its efforts to support Iraq’s Counterterrorism
Service (CTS) during Operation Inherent Resolve in 2014–18, the
US-led coalition inserted trainers and advisers throughout the Iraqi
chain of command. Moreover, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
mission effectively trained and retrained much of the Iraqi Army. As
a result, coalition and Iraqi commanders were able to identify the best
personnel—those with the culturally rare but militarily desirable skill
sets—and either lobbied for their promotion to key leadership slots and/
or their transfer to the CTS. Further, the CTS was given extensive training
of the type specific to special forces and enjoyed tremendous prestige and
popularity. Not surprisingly, the CTS performed demonstrably better
than conventional Iraqi formations and spearheaded every coalition
offensive against the so-called Islamic State, though Iraq lost many of
its best soldiers as a result.26
Nevertheless, the success of the Iraqi CTS would not have
been possible without Iraqi army critical enablers (such as tanks and
bulldozers) and the help of coalition forces (intelligence, logistics,
artillery, and air support). Should US trainers and advisers opt to use
the CTS model as a template elsewhere, such critical enablers must be
created in the partner’s conventional forces, or the United States or
other allies must be willing to provide them in times of need, placing
a premium on joint training between US forces and Arab allies that is
adaptable to various circumstances. Inevitably a trade-off is involved:
24. Pollack, Arabs at War, 514–51; and Michael Eisenstadt, Arming for Peace? Syria’s Elusive Quest
for “Strategic Parity,” Policy Paper No. 31 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 1992), 67–68, 70–72.
25. Pollack, Arabs at War, 218–66.
26. David Witty, Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter-Terrorism Service, Policy Focus 157 (Washington, DC:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2018), https://www.washingtoninstitute
.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-3.pdf; and Witty, The Iraqi Counter Terrorism
Service (Washington, DC: Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, March 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/David-Witty-Paper_Final_Web.pdf.
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teaching US partners how to integrate US enablers is cheaper and easier
than trying to create these capabilities in their militaries, but it creates
dependencies and implied obligations on the part of the United States
that Washington may be unwilling or unable to fulfill in a crisis.27
These examples underscore the limitations of this approach as
well. While ideal for operations where highly competent militaries
will provide the bulk of the fighting forces and only small Arab units
with modest capabilities are needed, concentrating personnel with the
right skills for military success in elite formations leaves an unbalanced
force with limited capabilities—one insufficent for larger or more
demanding missions.

Designing Military Operations

Another way Arab armed forces have learned to generate greater
combat effectiveness is by designing military operations that play to
their strengths. Arab armies have generally fared best when conducting
static defenses, preferably from fixed, fortified positions and backed by
plentiful fire support. On the offensive, Arab militaries have tended
to do best performing limited deliberate assaults, especially when they
can rely on firepower, surprise, and numerical advantages to overcome
enemy defenses. They tend to fare better when relying on artillery rather
than air support and when employing ground-based air defenses rather
than fighter operations.
In the air, on the ground, or even at sea, the most effective Arab
militaries have worked to avoid maneuver warfare, ad hoc operations,
or other missions that demand initiative and creativity from lower-level
commanders. On the offensive, Arab ground forces have consistently
performed worst when ordered to conduct fast-paced breakthrough and
exploitation operations meant to encircle enemy defenders and defeat
enemy reserves in fluid meeting engagements. Likewise, Arab air forces
have learned to eschew offensive counterair operations and complex
air campaigns.
The Egyptian Armed Forces in 1973 and the Iraqi Armed Forces
in 1987–88 were the best examples of Arab militaries that learned these
lessons and won limited victories by employing techniques tailored to
the strengths of their troops without implementing transformational
solutions that would have required far-reaching cultural or
institutional change.
Cairo’s original plan for the 1973 war was developed with the
Soviets and reflected the latter’s doctrine: the crossing of the Suez Canal
was to be followed by a breakout and exploitation to retake all of the
Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptians eventually deemed this plan unrealistic
and abandoned it. The plan they ultimately implemented instead was
developed without Soviet input and embodied a limited war approach

27. Dubik, “Partner Capacity Building,” 20–23.
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that exploited the vulnerabilities—and temporarily neutralized the
strengths—of Israel.
Specifically, it entailed a coordinated offensive to seize a
bridgehead on the far side of the Suez Canal and impose heavy costs
on counterattacking Israeli forces, thereby exploiting the latter’s
vulnerability to casualties. It also made innovative use of new antitank
and air defense systems to neutralize Israel’s main strengths—armor
and airpower. In addition to restoring Egyptian honor, the operation
discredited the Israeli assumption that the territorial status quo was
sustainable and enabled Cairo to regain the Sinai in postwar diplomacy.28
In the case of Iraq, facing possible defeat after losing the al-Faw
Peninsula to Iran in February 1986, Saddam Hussein turned the conduct
of the war over to his professional generals who then devised a new
strategy employing limited, systematic offensives to defeat the Iranians
and force them to accept a cease-fire. He also granted his generals greater
control over organization, force generation, and doctrine, accelerating a
trend of depoliticizing the military, promoting officers based on merit,
and giving commanders greater latitude. As a result, the general staff
developed a new approach involving extensively scripted offensives that
Iraq’s forces could accomplish with massive superiority in firepower,
numbers, and surprise. This new scheme ultimately enabled Iraq to smash
Iran’s exhausted ground forces and drive them from Iraqi territory.29
Both the Egyptians and Iraqis made special efforts to improve the
quality of their forces by increasing the number of high school and
college graduates. They studied failures and developed approaches that
avoided weaknesses and built on strengths, relying on heavily scripted
systematic operations obviating the need for initiative, improvisation, or
coordination of combined arms. They carried out exhaustive rehearsals
on detailed mockups of objectives. They reduced the responsibilities of
their soldiers and officers to a small number of mission-essential tasks
that could be practiced repeatedly and learned by rote, relieving them of
the need to exercise initiative or independent judgment.
These examples demonstrate Arab military forces can be trained
and organized to conduct certain useful military operations successfully
in a matter of years without the kind of truly transformational change
that could take decades to accomplish. It also illustrates operations must
be crafted to work within the culturally defined skill set of Arab armed
forces, avoiding operations they are ill-equipped to perform: in 1973,
when the Egyptians attempted to attack beyond their bridgeheads and
well-practiced scripts to seize the Sinai passes, they were crushed by
smaller Israeli forces in the same fashion as in 1967. Likewise in 1991
when the US-led coalition’s left-hook maneuver flanked Iraqi defenses
and thwarted their planned static defensive operations and deliberate
counterattacks, the Iraqi army was routed in a matter of days.
28. Eisenstadt and Pollack, “Armies of Snow,” 562–66; and Pollack, Arabs at War, 98–106.
29. Eisenstadt and Pollack, “Armies of Snow,” 568–69; and Pollack, Arabs at War, 218–29.
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These experiences also suggest Arab partner forces are best used
in circumstances allowing for meticulously planned, heavily scripted
methodical operations, extensive rehearsals involving rote fulfillment
of mission-essential tasks, and reliance on numbers, mass, and
overwhelming firepower to defeat the enemy. This assessment does
not preclude, however, the possibility of limited ad hoc, momentumdriven exploitation or pursuit operations when the adversary has been
thrown off balance or scattered, though in such cases US reserves and/
or standby air support should be available.

Structuring Arab Forces

A small number of Arab irregular forces have outperformed and
succeeded in bloodying conventional militaries—both Arab and foreign.
In the Second Lebanon War (2006), Hezbollah succeeded in inflicting
more Israeli casualties per Arab fighter than had any Arab army in any
previous Arab-Israeli war.30 Similarly in 2014, several thousand ISIS
fighters routed five divisions of the Iraqi army and conquered nearly a
quarter of Iraq. Likewise, the Houthi in Yemen, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
in Syria, and a number of other Arab militias and insurgent groups have
also fared surprisingly well in combat, especially when compared to the
more dismal overall record of the armed forces of the Arab states.31 What
factors account for the tenacity, commitment, and relative effectiveness
of some of these irregular forces, and can conventional Arab armed
forces exploit these factors to enhance their own military effectiveness?
Most modern armies try to mold recruits from diverse backgrounds
into a band of brothers willing to fight and die for one another, a common
goal, the nation, or an ideology or cause.32 By contrast, Arab irregular
forces often start with a band of brothers who are already a tight-knit
group united by family, clan, regional, and ethnosectarian solidarities,
and build a military organization on this foundation.
In such groups, the trust, confidence, and sense of mutual obligation
engendered by the aforementioned solidarities, as well as intensely felt
religious commitments (in sectarian or faith-based militias), often
create synergies that strengthen unit cohesion and ultimately enhance
30. Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the
Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, 2008), 76, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/the-2006
-lebanon-campaign-and-the-future-of-warfare-implications-for-army-and-defense-policy/.
31. Hamza Hendawi and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Humiliation at Rout Hits Iraqi Military Hard,”
Associated Press, June 18, 2014; Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, “Special Report:
How Mosul Fell—An Iraqi General Disputes Baghdad’s Story,” Reuters, October 14, 2014; and
Jessica Lewis, “The Terrorist Army Marching on Baghdad,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2014.
32. Michael Eisenstadt and Kendall Bianchi, “The Ties that Bind: Families, Clans, and
Hizballah’s Military Effectiveness,” War on the Rocks, December 15, 2017, https://warontherocks
.com/2017/12/ties-bind-families-clans-hizballahs-military-effectiveness/; Edward A. Shils and
Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): 280–315; Omer Bartov, “Daily Life and Motivation in War: The
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group performance.33 This trust enables the close teamwork and
cooperation needed in combat, while their religious zeal makes them
formidable opponents.34 By contrast, Arab conventional militaries are
often weakened by wide social gaps between the officer corps and foot
soldiers, the lack of a professional NCO corps to bridge these gaps, and
a culturally patterned top-down command structure that induces junior
officers to wait for orders from above.35
Arab irregular forces, however, are not unique in their use of social
solidarities to advance military ends. Various Arab regimes have created
praetorian units drawn from personnel sharing tribal or ethnosectarian
ties with the country’s leaders in order to defend against coups or
unrest.36 Such units have not only proved politically reliable, but as
discussed previously, generally have performed somewhat better on the
battlefield than regular units from these militaries. The success of these
praetorian units may be due, at least in part, to the mobilization of many
of the same social solidarities the aforementioned militias have relied
upon for their success.
The success of these units also has implications for US efforts to turn
allied Arab militaries into effective combat organizations. Arab armies
have tended to rely on the same methods used by armies elsewhere to
turn civilian recruits from diverse backgrounds into soldiers and create
effective units in large numbers—with little overall success. The key
for Arab regimes may be to find ways—without exacerbating social
tensions or engendering political strife—to strengthen their militaries
by constructively harnessing solidarities that have so often undermined
regime stability.
Some Arab militaries might therefore consider more broadly
applying the manpower model used by irregular forces, militias, and
praetorian units, which employ social solidarities to create more effective
combat units. They might also look to the British regimental system for
an example of a successful Western military that has often used local
affiliations to enhance unit esprit and cohesion.37 Certainly, organizing
units along local lines would require Arab regimes to accept a degree
of risk, potentially empowering competing tribal, ethnosectarian,
and regional groups and encouraging centrifugal tendencies within
their societies.

33. Norvell B. DeAtkine, “The Arab as Insurgent,” American Diplomacy (September 2009),
http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2009/09/the-arab-as-insurgent/.
34. Ángel Gómez et al., “The Devoted Actor’s Will to Fight and the Spiritual Dimension
of Human Conflict,” Nature Human Behavior 1 (2017): 673–79, https://www.nature.com/articles
/s41562-017-0193-3.
35. DeAtkine, “Arab as Insurgent”; and Pollack, Armies of Sand, 476–509.
36. Pollack, Armies of Sand, 107–28; and Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing,” 131–65.
37. Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, (New York, NY: Oxford
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A Different Military Culture?

Perhaps the most desirable but most difficult way to improve
the effectiveness of Arab militaries is by creating a distinct military
culture more conducive to success. Militaries are powerful agents of
human socialization. To a certain extent, they can help reshape people’s
thinking—expanding identities, reorienting values, shifting priorities,
and flipping default modes of conduct. At the most basic level, any truly
effective army has to be able to take young soldiers and train them to
do things their nature, upbringing, and education did not prepare them
for like charging a machine gun nest or parachuting from a perfectly
good airplane at 1,250 feet. But overcoming various tendencies inherent
in Arab society—rote learning, deference to authority, and a reluctance
to take the initiative—takes considerably more work than instilling the
courage necessary for success in battle.
The earlier a military can start to train and teach its personnel,
the more successful it is likely to be in changing fundamental patterns
of behavior. Cultural inculcation begins from the earliest periods of
childhood, and studies by anthropologists and social psychologists
indicate the period of late childhood (roughly ages 7–13) is when cultural
values and patterns of behavior are most decisively formed by family,
friends, and the educational system.38 If the younger personnel destined
for the military can be taught differently, culturally patterned values and
behavioral tendencies can be altered more easily.
Of all of the nations that attempted to improve the effectiveness of
a modern Arab military, the British had the greatest success, but only
in Jordan. The British created the modern Jordanian armed forces as
the famed Arab Legion in 1923. They recruited its personnel almost
exclusively from Bedouin tribes, accepted only volunteers, and insisted
on long terms of service. The British paid reasonably well and among
the Bedouin, soldiering was considered an honorable and prestigious
calling, further ensuring large numbers of eager and dedicated recruits.
Crucially, the British created Legion schools with a British
curriculum and British, or British-trained teachers. The Legion schools
prepared Jordanian boys from the age of 10 (in the middle of the critical
age range of cultural assimilation) for later service in the Legion. The
Legion’s formal military training, starting with basic training itself,
was also conducted principally by British personnel in accordance
with British practices. Indeed, the Legion was commanded mostly by
British officers, along with a smaller number of Jordanians who had
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been educated at Sandhurst, Camberley, and other British military
educational institutions.39
As a result, the Arab Legion was culturally a world apart from wider
Jordanian society. It felt and functioned much more like a British colonial
army with most of their strengths and weaknesses. Consequently the
Legion in 1948 was arguably the most formidable foe the Israelis ever
fought, demonstrating higher degrees of tactical initiative, innovation,
flexibility, and responsiveness than virtually any other Arab fighting
force except perhaps Hezbollah. The Legion also demonstrated the
tremendously strong individual soldiering skills, marksmanship, and
unit cohesion that were the hallmarks of the British Army for centuries.40
Without question it will be difficult for Arab states to adopt this
kind of model with the United States playing the role of mentor.
The educational systems of nearly all the Arab states continue to
underperform. And both inertial bureaucracies resistant to change and
traditional elites fearful of cultural contamination from the West would
likely oppose change as they have past efforts to modernize both military
and civilian educational methods.41 But the UAE has partly adopted
the Arab Legion model, and its example may furnish some insight into
employing it more broadly. The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohamed
bin Zayed Al Nahyan, has long been a proponent of educating young
Emiratis abroad. As part of his effort to bolster UAE military power,
he instituted conscription and used it to bring more foreign-educated
Emiratis into the officer corps. He has reinforced this focus by relying
heavily on Western training methods, sending many Emirati personnel
to Western military schools and employing many Westerners as trainers
in Emirati programs.
Of course, the UAE has also kept its armed forces small, focused
on quality, and has taken a number of other steps that have enhanced
Emirati military capabilities. By consciously cultivating foreign-educated
and foreign-trained military personnel, Abu Dhabi has begun to create a
military culture distinctly different from its wider society, contributing
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to its relative military effectiveness in Yemen.42 Attempts to apply the
Emirati experience to much larger Arab states would undoubtedly face
formidable challenges, however.
The foregoing analysis underscores the importance of educational
reform both for the political and socioeconomic development of Arab
societies and as a national security imperative. An educated manpower
base is a prerequisite for the creation of an effective military. Likewise,
greater emphasis must be placed on building up the training base of
Arab armies, focusing more on basic soldiering skills and weapons
familiarization training. Too often soldiers arrive in units without an
adequate general educational foundation and only the most rudimentary
military skills. It is unrealistic to expect units to make up for this deficit
while also attempting to conduct collective training and managing the
reception of new recruits and the release of trained conscripts from
active service.

Getting the Politics Right

A revamped US concept for SFA building on elements of these
four approaches—relying on small, elite formations; designing military
operations to account for Arab strengths and weaknesses; structuring
Arab military forces to take advantage of social solidarities; and creating
military subcultures that would foster militarily desirable skills—could
produce more effective Arab military partners. But transitioning to such
a model will create significant organizational and political obstacles on
both sides. Generally, the US military has not tailored its training to fit
the cultural proclivities of other nations due to its faith in the efficacy
of its own doctrine, as well as a belief that doing so would, in effect,
mean providing substandard training. Instead, the United States has
traditionally taken a one-size-fits-all approach, which it modifies largely
to account for differences in the aptitude and abilities of its partners.
This approach will have to change.
Moreover, only a special type of individual is likely to succeed as an
American adviser or trainer in the unique cultural milieu of the Arab
Middle East. The Army should establish a rigorous assessment and
selection process to identify individuals who have the right stuff for the
mission—the right personal and psychological attributes, open to doing
things differently from the traditional US Army way.
Because Arab militaries are officer-centric, US train and advise
efforts in the Arab world should be officer-centric as well. Personnel
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should be drawn largely from the ranks of the officer corps, and NCOs
should be frocked as officers for the duration of their tours to enhance
their standing and credibility in the eyes of their Arab partners. Moreover
before arriving in the Middle East, advisers and trainers should attend
a six- to twelve-month course to familiarize them with Arab and Arab
military culture and to teach them how to train Arab soldiers and
officers. They would have to be willing to volunteer for relatively long
deployments of two to three years to enable relationship-building and
ensure continuity of effort. This requirement alone will significantly
diminish the pool of available volunteers, but it is the best way to ensure
those sent will have a real impact.
Furthermore, the United States will have to develop a distinct
doctrine for partner Arab forces—or possibly a family of doctrines
to account for variations between states—based on what has worked
for successful Arab militaries in the past (for example, Egypt in 1973
and Iraq in 1987–88) as US doctrine will often be inappropriate. The
program of instruction taught to Arab partners should be modified to
de-emphasize bottom-up initiative, quick decision making, and ad hoc
or improvised operations, and should instead emphasize static defense,
coordination of firepower, deliberate assaults for limited objectives,
and sequential vice simultaneous operations. Conceivably, elite Arab
special forces units could be taught doctrine and procedures closer to
standard US doctrine, especially if they are comprised of soldiers and
officers selected for their greater initiative, aggressiveness, and ability
to improvise.
Overcoming political and bureaucratic opposition on the US side will
only be part of the problem. America’s Arab partners get a vote too. The
first political hurdle will be convincing them to allow American trainers
and advisers to teach something other than standard US doctrine as
taught to American servicemembers. At least some, and possibly all, of
America’s Arab allies may feel shortchanged if they believe their troops
are getting something other than what the US military teaches its own.
Moreover, SFA in the Arab Middle East will rarely be a narrow
military-technical activity. On the contrary, because most Arab regimes
ultimately depend on their militaries for survival, any tinkering with
their workings is an inherently political activity touching on the most
sensitive matters of state.43 Accordingly, US trainers and advisers
must understand the political implications of what they are trying to
accomplish, especially in societies where ethnosectarian divisions,
corruption, or the malign influence of neighbors may impose significant
limits on what they may be able to accomplish.
Any effort to improve the effectiveness of certain units or the
military writ large may have implications for the balance of power among
political elites. And even if trainers and advisers succeed in making more
capable forces, the zero-sum, winner-takes-all approach to politics may
43. Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).
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result in their being used in a way that results in greater instability—and
thus less security.
Mitigating these potential impacts might require the United States
to become more deeply involved in the selection of personnel, military
organizational matters, and efforts to counter meddling by neighboring
states than would be considered desirable.44 Such mitigation could
require high-level intervention by senior officials on the ground and
in Washington. For instance, during the 2007–8 US surge in Iraq, then
Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker
(among others) worked to protect competent officers and prevailed upon
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to fire numerous malefactors in the ISF
and have competent personnel promoted in their place.45 United States
military and diplomatic officials were able to take these actions because
the United States had 150,000 troops on the ground, and as a result
Washington had tremendous leverage, and was highly motivated and
engaged.46 This kind of situation, however, is obviously the exception
rather than the rule.
As always in politics, nothing worth doing is ever easy. But as
America’s strategic focus and military assets eventually shift to other
regions of the world, and the US interventions of the past three decades
in Iraq and elsewhere fade into the past, the United States will have no
choice but to rethink its approach to SFA in the Middle East. For better
or worse, the Middle East remains a region of vital interest to the United
States, one still facing threats from terrorists and aspiring hegemons,
and which continues to export its instability to the rest of the world,
including to the United States. Unless the American people are willing
to walk away from the Middle East, leaving a security vacuum that will
most likely be filled by Iran and all manner of vicious extremist groups,
the United States will have to find a better way to build effective Arab
partners and allies. It is our hope this article will prompt a rethink of the
US approach toward SFA in the Middle East and thus mark a first step
toward achieving this goal.
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